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Human Welfare, Not Human Rights
Eric A. Posner*
March 1, 2008

Abstract. Human rights treaties play an important role in international relations but they lack a
foundation in moral philosophy and doubts have been raised about their effectiveness for
constraining states. Drawing on ideas from the literature on economic development, this paper
argues that international concern should be focused on human welfare rather than on human rights.
A focus on welfare has three advantages. First, the proposition that governments should advance
the welfare of their populations enjoys broader international and philosophical support than do the
various rights that are incorporated in the human rights treaties. Second, the human rights treaties
are both too rigid and too vague—they do not allow governments to adopt reasonable policies that
advance welfare at the expense of rights, and they do not set forth rules governing how states may
trade off rights. A welfare treaty could provide guidance by supplying a maximand along with
verifiable measures of compliance. Third, the human rights regime and international development
policy work at cross-purposes. Development policy favors the poorest states, while the human
rights regime condemns the states with the worst governments: unfortunately, the poorest states
usually have the worst governments. Various possible welfare treaties are surveyed.

Introduction
The U.S. State Department annually publishes a list of nations that violate human
rights. Many NGOs do the same.2 These lists identify states that torture dissidents, detain
people without charging them, suppress religious minorities, and commit other abuses.
The reports condemn violators of human rights and urge leading states to pressure
human-rights abusers until they bring their conduct in line with international standards.
Indeed, the United States imposes certain legal disabilities on human rights-abusing
states,3 and the European Union makes ratification of the European Convention on
1
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1
See, e.g., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2006, released by the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006.
2
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, World Report 2008 (2008); Amnesty Int’l, Amnesty International Report
2007: The State of the World’s Human Rights (2007); Freedom House, The Worst of the Worst: The
World’s Most Repressive Societies 2007 (2007).
3
See Henry J. Steiner et al., International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 936-37 (3rd ed.
2008)
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Human Rights a condition of membership.4 International organizations like the World
Bank encourage recipients of aid to improve their human rights records.5 And by
ratifying human rights treaties, even the most powerful states promise to respect the
human rights of their populations.
Most states have ratified most of these treaties.6 The treaties bar genocide, torture,
arbitrary detention, and other rights-violating activities.7 Although the treaties lack an
enforcement mechanism, nations appear to take the treaties seriously enough to defend
themselves against accusations that they have violated their treaty obligations, both in
public statements and before various international and regional bodies that monitor
compliance with human rights treaties.
Now consider an alternative world. Suppose that the State Department and the
NGOs published annual lists of “low-welfare” states. These are states in which the public
suffers from low levels of utility. The reason for the misery of the public could be human
rights abuse, of course, but there are many other reasons for misery as well. The state
might not supply a sufficiently generous social safety net. Or the state might not enforce
property and contract rights, so that individual initiative is discouraged and markets fail.
The government might be inept or corrupt, and thus unable to protect people from natural
disasters, insurgencies, crime, and the like. States that appear on the low-welfare lists
would be subject to public criticism. Powerful states would pressure the governments of
low-welfare states to improve the well-being of their populations, at least to the extent
that low welfare can be attributed to the government’s unwillingness to provide adequate
services. NGOs would join in.
4

In narrow circumstances foreign sovereign immunity is not granted to designated state sponsors of
terrorism for acts that violate certain human rights. See 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7).
5
See Joe E. Oestreich, Power and Principle: Human Rights Programming in International Organizations
(2007).
6
See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, & John W. Meyer, International Human Rights Law and
the Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties, 23 Int’l Soc. 115, 118 tbl. 1
(2008).
7
See Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of the Families,
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1517 (entered into force July 1, 2003); Convention on the
Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990);
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987)
[hereinafter Convention against Torture]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S 13 (entered into force Sept. 3 1981);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E,
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
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We could also imagine a parallel legal world. The human rights treaties are
replaced or supplemented with human welfare treaties. The human welfare treaties oblige
states to maintain a certain level of welfare among their citizens, or even to promote or
maximize their welfare. The treaties could be more specific, requiring actions that are
known to enhance welfare in broad circumstances, such as natural disaster relief. These
treaties would overlap with existing human rights treaties to the extent that respect for
certain human rights also tends to maximize welfare, but the treaties would give no
priority to rights; they would instead recognize that rights would be trumped when they
bar government actions that advance welfarist goals.
If the proposal to replace the human rights approach with a welfarist approach
seems puzzling, considering the following. First, the proposition that all people enjoy a
specified set of human rights—that is, rights grounded in universal moral principles that
require governments to aid, protect, and refrain from abusing their own citizens—is
highly controversial among philosophers.8 The absence of a philosophical justification
for human rights yields well-known difficulties: that states disagree about which rights
are human rights, about which human rights should have priority, about how resources
should be allocated for the purpose of correcting human rights violations, and about how
much respect should be given to cultural variation. In the absence of a principled basis for
human rights, these disputes cannot even in principle be resolved.9
Second, if great controversy surrounds the question of rights, most people agree
that the well-being of other human beings is a matter of international concern.10 In
contrast to the anemic efforts to enforce human rights treaties, developed states have
contributed massive amounts of aid to the poorest nations. Aid to victims of natural
disasters is commonplace. Development aid is more controversial but still largely
unquestioned. The commitment to aiding people who live in the poorest states is in
tension with a human rights regime that envisions isolating the worst governments,
because the worst governments usually govern the poorest states.
Third, many of the debates about human rights are implicitly debates about the
role of welfare. Developing nations often resist pressure to improve their human rights
8

See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations 2–8 (Univ. of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14/2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999874; Jack
Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 Hum. Rts. Q. 281, 292–93 (2007).
9
Compare, e.g., Theo van Boven, Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights, in 1 The International
Dimensions of Human Rights 43 (Kard Vasak & Philip Alston eds. 1982) (arguing that there is a hierarchy
of human rights), and Theodor Meron, On a Hierarch of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. Int’l L 1,
21 (1986) (disputing this claim).
10
Most philosophers, even deontologists, believe that states should be concerned with the well-being of
their citizens. See, e.g., Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics (1997).
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records by asserting collective rights—rights to economic development, for example.11
Vigorous disagreements about whether human rights are universal or not coexist with a
general consensus that governments should enhance well-being by (among other things)
reducing poverty and improving education: no one argues that in some countries
governments should impoverish their citizens. Indeed, it is possible to believe that
international human rights law has nothing to do with human rights in the philosophical
sense: it refers instead to the limits on sovereignty imposed by international morality,
whether or not international morality has anything to do with rights.12 If this is correct,
then we should directly inquire what international morality requires rather than try to
defend or rationalize the existing rights regime.
Finally, recent empirical studies suggest that states that ratify human rights
treaties do not improve their human rights performance, or, at least, that improvements
are small and sporadic and hard to measure, perhaps limited only to certain types of
states—democracies, for example.13 These studies are controversial, but they raise the
question whether a different type of treaty regime would produce better outcomes.
In this paper, I defend a welfarist alternative to international human rights law.
Part I briefly surveys the human rights regime and its problems. It argues that the human
rights treaties are both excessively rigid and excessively vague. Their rigidity consists in
their refusal to allow states to trade off different values—for example, to allow states to
11

See Geoffrey York, Citing “Right To Development,” China Rejects Emission Cap, Globe and Mail, June
5, 2007, at A1. See also Information Office of the State Council of China, Progress in China's Human
Rights Cause in 2003 at ch. I (The People's Rights to Subsistence and Development), available at
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20040330/index.htm (2004). The UN General Assembly declared the
existence of a right to development in 1986. See United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the
Right to Development, Resolution 41/128 (1986).
12
See Raz, Human Rights, supra note __ at 14.
13
See Beth Simmons, Complying with the Law: The Case of International Human Rights Treaties (2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding some but limited impact); Eric Neumayer, Do
International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. of Conflict Resolution 925,
950–51 (2005) (finding that ratification of human rights treaties improves a state’s respect for human rights
if it has a well developed democratic system of governance and a strong civil society); Emilie M. HafnerBurton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110
Am. J. of Soc. 1373, 1395–1402 (2005) (concluding that the ratification of human rights treaties does little
to reduce violation of a person’s right to security); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 Yale L. J. 1935, 1998 (2002) (finding no positive statistically significant relationship
between treaty ratification and human rights compliance); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights
Behavior?, 36 J. of Peace Res. 95, (1999) (similar). See also Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & James Ron, Can
the Human Rights Movement Achieve its Goals? 12–17 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~ehafner/pdfs/achieve_goals.pdf) (reviewing the state of empirical research
regarding the impact of human rights treaties on human rights violations).
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violate political rights in order to enhance the overall well-being of the population. Their
vagueness lies in their failure to provide mechanisms for evaluating a state’s allocation of
resources among projects that promote the public good. I argue that rather than trying to
specify the obligations of government in terms of respecting specific rights, negative and
positive, the treaties should require that states enhance the public welfare.
Part II sets out this welfarist alternative, including some ideas about how to
implement it effectively with verifiable measures of human well-being. Part III discusses
the relationship between the welfarist approach to human rights and foreign aid, arguing
that welfarist treaties would help resolve the tension between the human rights regime
and development policy.
I. Diagnosis
A. The Legal Regime
There are seven major UN-sponsored human rights treaties. These treaties ban
torture, racial discrimination, and discrimination against women; and guarantee “civil and
political” rights, “economic, social, and cultural” rights, the rights of migrant workers,
and the rights of the child.14 The treaties all enjoy a large measure of support, with
participation rates ranging from 70 percent to nearly 100 percent of UN members.15 The
UN has also recently adopted a treaty to guarantee the rights of the disabled. In addition
to these treaties, several regional human rights treaties exist. The most important is the
European Convention on Human Rights, which has, uniquely, a highly developed judicial
system.16 There are also regional treaties in Africa and the Americas.17
Table 1 provides a rough picture of the landscape.

14

See supra note __.
See Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, & Meyer, supra note __, at 118 tbl. 1.
16
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), as amended by Protocol 11, opened for
signature May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998).
17
See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981 1520 U.N.T.S 217 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1986); American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
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Right
Negative Rights
Life
Torture, cruel
punishment
Slavery
Liberty/detention
Fair trial
Privacy
Freedom of thought,
religion, speech
Association
Marriage/family
Political participation
Equal protection
Positive Rights
Work, fair wages
Unionization
Social security
Family assistance
Adequate standard of
living
Health care
Education

Table 1: Four Major Human Rights Instruments
Economic,
Universal
Civil and
Social, and
Declaration of
Political Rights
Cultural Rights
Human Rights

European
Convention of
Human Rights

6
7

3
5

2
3

8
9–11
14–15
17
18–19

4
3, 9
8, 10–11
12
18, 19

4
5
6–7
8
9–10

21–22
23
25
2, 26

20
16
21
2, 7

11
12
Protocol 1, Art. 3
14

6–7
8
9
10
11

23
23
22
25
25

12
13–14

25
26

Protocol 1, Art. 2

The two most important and comprehensive of the United Nations treaties are the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (column 2) and the International
Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (column 3). The ICCPR is a charter
of negative rights, while the ICESCR is a charter of positive rights. Negative rights are
rights to be free of interference from other people and from the government; in particular,
the government is prohibited from restricting the activities of the rights holders, activities
like political debate and religious worship. Positive rights are rights to receive benefits
from the government; the government is required to provide benefits such as health care
or education. Negative rights are associated with the classical liberal tradition of natural
law, especially as embodied in the social contract theories of Locke and his successors,
including the founders of the United States of America, who were particularly concerned
about governmental abuse of power. Positive rights are associated with a range of
liberalism’s critics, including Marxists. The Universal Declaration, a legally nonbinding
document that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, and predated the
ICCPR and ICESCR by several decades, contains both rights, as Table 1 shows. The cold
war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in the bifurcated
7

treaty system—with negative rights contained in the ICCPR, which the United States
championed, and positive rights contained in the ICESCR, which the Soviet Union
championed.18
Today, most countries have ratified both treaties (the United States has not
ratified the ICESCR, however). Nonetheless, it is clear that states take negative rights
more seriously than the positive rights of the ICESCR. The priority of negative rights
takes many forms. As Table 1 shows, the ECHR, which is the only human rights treaty
that provides for routine adjudication of its provisions, and appears to enjoy widespread
compliance, is mainly a charter of negative rights. Although many national constitutions
contain positive rights as well as negative rights, for the most part only negative rights are
justiciable.19 NGOs recognize that they can most effectively draw attention to violations
of negative rights; for that reason, the main human rights watchdogs largely ignore
violations of economic, social, and cultural rights.20 Thus, although most developed states
do provide benefits to their citizens—health care, education, a social safety net, and so
forth—they refuse to place these benefits outside the realm of democratic politics. By
contrast, political rights in these states are outside the realm of democratic politics. I will
return to this issue in Part I.B.
Scholars have advanced two types of theories that justify or explain the human
rights regimes. Moral theories argue that human rights treaties are good; political theories
argue that human rights treaties are in the interest of states or most states, or the most
powerful states.
Moral theories typically hold that individuals have inherent human rights,
derivable from the basic postulate of equal human dignity.21 These rights are universal,
held by all people by virtue of being human. Few philosophers seem willing to defend
this position any more, though it is entrenched in the legal materials and rhetoric of
human rights. The philosophical literature now focuses on contractarian and welfarist
approaches. Contractarians derive human rights from a Rawlsian original position
argument where the veil of ignorance deprives people of knowledge of their nationality.
Not knowing which nation they would belong to, people in the original position would

18

Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights 221-29 (2004).
The major exceptions are India and South Africa. See Steiner et al., supra note __, at 321-47.
20
See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an
International Human Rights Organization, 26 Hum. Rts. Q. 63 (2004).
21
E.g., Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (1982). For a survey of
moral theories of human rights, see Allen Buchanan & David Golove, Philosophy of International Law, in
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 808 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro ed. 2002).
19
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choose international institutions that protect the rights of all human beings.22 Welfarists
argue that everyone has moral worth, and that just international institutions would
maximize a social welfare function that included the utilities of all people in the world.23
It is an understatement to say that these theories are controversial; an enormous
literature debates them. It is less well known that none of the proponents of these theories
pays much attention to the actual human rights treaty regime. The debate hovers at a
theoretical altitude high above the facts on the ground. A few philosophers cite the
Universal Declaration, which is a vague, hortatory document with no legal effect. Other
philosophers pick and choose among provisions of national constitutions, singling out
those provisions that they approve of. The debate is best understood as an argument about
whether states should respect some, mostly undefined, set of human rights, not about
whether the existing human rights treaty regime is morally justified.
Consider, for example, the work of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.
Nussbaum and Sen argue that states should be required to advance the “capabilities” of
their citizens, that is, their ability to enjoy various objective goods such as health,
literacy, and political participation. Their approach differs from that of traditional
development economists, who believe that states should maximize economic welfare—
that is, the satisfaction of subjective preferences as measured by willingness to pay. Yet
Nussbaum and Sen are both “welfarists” in the broader sense that they emphasize that
states should advance the well-being of people. And both scholars argue that their
approach is consistent with the traditional human rights agenda.24
Neither scholar, however, addresses the existing human rights regime—that is, the
legal regime embodied in treaties such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Sen has declined
to explain how exactly the capabilities approach would be implemented, arguing that
it is important to emphasizes the catholicity that the approach has. The
foundational affirmation of the importance of capabilities can go with various
strategies of evaluation involving practical compromises. The pragmatic nature of
practical reason demands this.25

22

See, e.g., Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relation (1979); Thomas Pogge, Realizing
Rawls (1989).
23
For a discussion, see Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487
(2006).
24
See Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership 284-91 (2006);
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 226-48 (1999).
25
Id. at 85.
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A fair point, but then the question is why Sen would think that the existing human rights
regime would be consistent with the capabilities approach. That regime does not embrace
catholicity but takes a specific approach to human rights in order to avoid the type of fatal
indefiniteness that renders treaties unenforceable.
Nussbaum similarly insists that the “language of capabilities … gives important
precision and supplementation to the language of rights.”26 She argues that the
capabilities approach resembles the human rights approach and concludes that therefore it
“should not be seen as a rival of the human rights approach.”27 From a legal perspective,
these claims are puzzling. Either international law will continue to embody the existing
human rights approach or it will be modified so as to reflect Nussbaum’s alternative
approach. It cannot do both. As I have noted, the existing human rights approach, for all
the talk of positive rights, gives priority to negative rights. But as Nussbaum
acknowledges,28 the emphasis on negative rights is inconsistent with the capabilities
approach. In addition, the ICESCR, which insists on generous positive rights while
allowing states to take their time before satisfying them, and does not provide a
mechanism for allocating resources among rights, positive and negative, would be a
highly unsatisfactory instrument for implementing the capabilities approach.29 If a treaty
is ambiguous, then states can easily comply with it without appreciably changing their
behavior.
Unhappiness with moral theories of human rights has led to the growth of
political theories of human rights. Political theories argue that states or groups within
states have an interest in agreeing to human rights.30 The human rights treaty regime rests
on an overlapping consensus about the obligations of states with mostly different but not
wholly incompatible interests and moral and religious commitments.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, created in the wake of World War
II, expressed revulsion at the ideology and methods of the Nazis but it did not express a
moral consensus beyond the rejection of fascism, as was acknowledged at the time.31
This became unmistakable in the following years as governments attempted to reduce the
ambiguous, hortatory provisions of the Universal Declaration to acceptably specific rules
in legally binding treaties. Western states that initiated the treaty regime sought to
26

Nussbaum, Frontiers, supra note __, at 284.
Id. at 291.
28
Id.
29
See infra note __ and accompanying text.
27

30

See Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 Hum. Rts. Q. 281, 292–93 (2007);
Charles R. Beitz, Human Rights as a Common Concern, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 269, 279–81 (2001) Charles
R. Beitz, What Human Rights Mean, 132 Daedalus 36, 44–46 (2003).
31
See Ishay, supra note __, at 218-24.
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publicize their commitment to liberal values, while drawing attention to the rejection of
these values by the Soviet Union and its allies. They hoped that these values would
appeal to people and governments around the world, who would reject the Soviet model.
The eastern bloc championed social, economic, and cultural rights that, it claimed, were
vindicated in communist, and not in western, societies.
Developing states have ratified the treaties for more diverse reasons. Some
developing states succumbed to pressure from western states that tied aid and other
benefits (such as EU membership) to treaty ratification. Other developing states may
have ratified the treaties in order to show that they were “modern” or endorsed
modernization or because newly empowered elites or other groups were committed to
western values.32 Governments of newly democratic states may have ratified the treaties
in an effort to prevent future governments from reversing democratic reforms.33
B. Problems
Why have the human rights treaties had such little effect on states’ human rights
practices? Many people have emphasized the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the
human rights treaties.34 However, many successful treaties do not have enforcement
mechanisms or have highly limited adjudication and enforcement systems. In the end, all
treaties rely for enforcement on the initiative of member states. Although enforcement
mechanisms can help improve compliance, the absence of effective enforcement
instruments most likely reflects states’ lack of enthusiasm for human rights treaties rather
than inadvertence or insufficient foresight. The enforcement-mechanisms theory just
raises another question: why don’t states show more enthusiasm for ensuring compliance
with the human rights treaties that they have negotiated?
A common answer to this question is that states are jealous of their sovereignty.
But this answer is also not persuasive. States agree to all kinds of incursions on their
sovereignty in return for the benefits of international cooperation. For example, all states
have given up the right to discriminate against aliens on their territory. They have done so
in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit—nondiscrimination against their citizens when
they are on foreign territory. Why shouldn’t this logic apply to human rights?

32

See Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, supra at 135-38.
See Andrew Moravscik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe, 54 Int’l Org. 217, 228 (2000) (arguing that newly established democracies seek to bind themselves
to human rights treaties as a way to lock in democratic rule).
34
See, e.g., Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements
Influence Government Repression, 59 Int’l Org. 593, 603 (2005); Hathaway, supra note __, at 2006–07.
33

11

A more plausible explanation for the current state of affairs is that the developed
nations perceive their interest in ensuring that other nations improve their human rights
performance as real but limited. All else equal, developed nations are willing to incur
costs to encourage or force other nations to improve human rights practices, but all else is
not equal. Developed nations refrain from pressuring human rights abusers when they
have strategic, trade, or other interests in maintaining a harmonious relationship. Humanrights abusing governments have no special interest in ending their human rights abuse
except in response to carrots and sticks offered by the developed nations. If the carrots
are puny and the sticks are flimsy, then these governments will not improve their respect
for human rights.35
This view is roughly consistent with the political theory of human rights treaties.
An overlapping consensus holds that human rights matter. It just turns out that
governments are not willing to devote substantial resources to enforcing that consensus.
However, there is another possible view, which is that the human rights treaties
do not reflect a political consensus, or that they reflect a consensus that is so shallow as to
be practically meaningless. Nor do they reflect fundamental moral values that
governments and populations support.
Consider the cases where states argue that their human rights obligations do not,
or should not, bind them, because other values are equally important. Typically, states
argue that national security or cultural tradition or even economic growth justifies
violation of rights (or alternatively argue that the rights are defeasible or limited for these
reasons). The currently defunct Asian values debate and the more recent challenge from
Islam are versions of this argument.36 Though these claims are invariably met with
skepticism by the human rights community, it is worth understanding why governments
make them. They argue that if (“western”) human rights treaties are respected in a given
situation, the public will be worse off—thrown into civil war, vulnerable to insurgents,
or, alternatively, unable to engage in practices that they value. In short, human rights
obligations interfere with welfare-promoting activities of the government, and these
welfare-promoting activities should be given priority.
Many commentators have interpreted the Asian-values challenge as a
philosophical debate about the universality of human rights. On this view, the critics are
35

See, e.g., Ishay, supra note __ at 218-24 (describing the cold war priorities of the superpowers, which
was to support their client states irrespective of their human rights practices).
36
See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates about
“Values in Asia,” 14 Indiana Inter’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2003) (discussing the Asian values debate);
Abdullahi Amed An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World, 3 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 13 (1990)
(describing the tension between Shari’a and human rights).
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cultural relativists, and one can easily refute them by pointing out the well-known
philosophical difficulties with moral relativism and precedents for western-style human
rights in Confucianism, Islam, and other non-western traditions.37 This critique
misconceives the challenge, however. The better interpretation of the challenge is that
virtually all governments concede that they have a (“universal”) obligation to advance the
welfare of their populations, but, given local conditions and traditions, they cannot
advance the welfare of their populations if they are constrained by the human rights
treaties. The treaties do not allow governments to make the tradeoffs they need to make
in order to advance the public interest.
The tendency has been to dismiss such arguments as pretextual or self-serving but
they deserve a serious hearing. Nussbaum and Sen, for example, should agree with them
in principle. A government with limited resources that seeks to enhance the capabilities
of its population might correctly believe that investment in education, health, and
infrastructure will do more for more people than an expensive and possibly futile
crackdown on local police who detain suspected criminals without charging them.
Governance unavoidably involves tradeoffs: money spent for primary education must be
taken from health clinics or police forces. Although everyone agrees that governments
should spend at least some money on education, some on health clinics, and some on the
police, no one agrees how much money the government should allocate among these and
other activities. Nor is there any reason to think that, beyond the barest minima, there are
any universally proper ways to distribute resources. For a very poor country, a
government might justifiably refuse to finance education because health and security
needs are so pressing.
This point is not ignored by the human rights treaties but they recognize it only in
a highly imperfect way. These treaties do, with several exceptions, give governments
discretion to make legitimate tradeoffs. With respect to positive rights, the ICESCR
recognizes that states should take steps “to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of [those] rights … by all appropriate
means.”38 This provision implicitly recognizes that states may not have the capacity to
satisfy the positive rights immediately, as the UN Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Committee has held.39 Commentators agree that it is difficult to complain about states’
budgetary priorities, given the difficulty for outsiders of evaluating the competing
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See Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, supra at 118-23.
ICESCR, Art. 2(1).
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Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, UN Doc. E./1991/23,
Annex III (1990).
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demands on the government.40 With respect to negative rights, the ICCPR frequently
acknowledges “limitations,” which permit the rights to be balanced against other
considerations. For example, the right to freedom of expression may be restricted “for the
protection of national security or of public order …, or of public health or morals.”41 In
addition, the ICCPR allows states to derogate from certain rights “in time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation.”42 Other human rights treaties have
similar provisions.
However, the treaties provide no way of evaluating the tradeoffs that governments
actually make. Suppose that in two otherwise identical states, one government devotes
$10 million to retraining the police so as to reduce the amount of torture. Suppose further
that this amount of training would cause the total number of torture incidents per year to
fall from 10,000 to 5,000. Meanwhile, another government devotes $1 million to
retraining the police, and the amount of torture falls from 10,000 to 9,000 incidents per
year. If the government’s budget is $50 billion per year, do either or both governments
violate the ICCPR? What if the government that spends only $1 million per year uses the
money saved to build health clinics in poor rural areas, whereas the government that
spends $10 million per year devotes much of its budget on lavish spending for the ruling
class? Are these relevant considerations in evaluating the states’ overall compliance with
the human rights treaties?
It is possible that a state might cite its positive-right obligation to supply health
care under the ICESCR as a justification for its failure to fully respect the negative-right
obligation not to torture under the ICCPR. However, the treaties themselves do not
permit such an argument. The ban on torture is unqualified, and although the amount of
resources that states must devote to implement the ban is unspecified, any argument that
a state does better by devoting resources to health care than to eliminating torture would
be met with skepticism by the human rights community. If such an argument were
accepted, the treaty regime would be excessively vague: it would permit states to violate
human rights under the cover of pretext.
The human rights treaties thus commit two types of errors. First, in some places
they do not permit governments that seek in good faith to advance the general welfare of
the public to make reasonable tradeoffs—devoting resources to acute problems and
denying resources to problems that, in local context, are less pressing. Second, in other
40

See, e.g., Varun Gauri, Social Rights and Economics: Claims To Health Care and Education in
Developing Countries, in Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement 65 (Philip
Alston & Mary Robinson eds. 2005).
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ICCPR, Art. 19(3)(b).
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ICCPR, Art. 4(1).
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places they allow tradeoffs without supplying a mechanism for evaluating those tradeoffs.
The treaty regime manages to sail both into the Scylla of excessive strictness and the
Charybdis of excessive vagueness.
C. An International Welfare Fund
One can better understand the problems with the current regime, and obtain an
idea about how to reform it, by undertaking the following thought experiment.
Suppose that the populations of nations care, at least a little, about the well-being
of people living in other countries. We can think of the degree or intensity of care in
monetary terms as the amount that individuals would be willing to pay in taxes for the
benefit of foreigners. No doubt this amount is much higher in wealthy nations than in
poorer nations simply because wealthy people have more money to spare, but for the sake
of simplicity we will imagine that each state, or many or most states, would contribute
some amount, M, to a common fund that would be used to help those in the most need of
aid. This fund is an analytic construct only; nothing I will say depends on the
establishment of an actual fund. M can be thought of as the monetized value of in-kind
contributions such as military support for an unstable government or for rebels who seek
to overthrow that government; diplomatic pressure; sanctions; traditional aid; trade
benefits; immigration privileges; and so forth.
Three straightforward but important points can be made about the fund. First, the
contributions are likely to be higher, the more that the fund is used effectively for ends
that people with diverse views and from different nations approve of. The more
overlapping the consensus is, the more that can be done.
Second, the fund itself is best used in a manner that is coordinated, or internally
consistent, for otherwise resources will be wasted.43 For example, suppose that some
people think that a government of a poor state should build hydroelectric dams in order to
ensure a supply of electricity, while other people think that the government should not
build such dams because they damage the environment, harm the fishing industry, and
reduce tourism revenues. It would be a great mistake if money in the fund both financed
the dam and financed local NGOs which oppose the dam. It would be much better to use
the money for some other purpose that everyone agrees to.
43

This is a truism in the aid literature. See, e.g., Arnbab Acharya, Ana Fuzzo de Lima, & Mick Moore, Aid
Proliferation: How Responsible Are the Donors? (IDS Working Paper 214, 2004) (pointing out the costs to
donee countries from dealing with multiple donors); Stephen Knack & Aminur Rahman, Donor
Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients (World Bank Working Paper No. 3286, 2004)
(providing empirical evidence); Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, & Marta Reynal-Querol, Aid with
Multiple Personalities (Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper, 2005) (providing empirical evidence).
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Third, the fund should be used to pressure states that are most likely to be
vulnerable to pressure. Such states are typically poor and weak. Pressuring China, Russia,
Canada, or the United States is likely to be futile, or, in any event, less effective for
enhancing global welfare than pressuring Sudan or Zimbabwe.
The defects of the human rights regime can be redescribed with the help of the
fund heuristic. States that seek in good faith to spend the fund in a manner suggested by
the human rights treaties would withhold resources from reasonable governments that,
faced with difficult choices, decide to reduce poverty rather than tackle negative rights
violations committed by the police or military. At the same time, they would have no
guidance as to how to treat states that allocate resources among health care, poverty
relief, education, and other goods in wise or unwise ways. Hampered by the absence of a
set of guiding principles, states would predictably respond inconsistently. Is there a better
way?
II. The Welfarist Treaty
A. The General Approach
The challenge, then, is to construct a treaty regime that specifies how resources—
defined broadly to include aid, military intervention, diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and
the like—should be used for altruistic purposes.
A welfarist treaty would obligate states to promote the well-being of the global
population. Given the constraints of the state system, which drives governments to give
priority to their own populations and not to foreign populations, a viable welfarist treaty
would not obligate states to equalize the wealth of individuals across borders—indeed,
even the most egalitarian states do not go this far for their own populations. Instead, a
welfare treaty might establish welfare floors or some other system of priority that
identified the lowest-welfare states. These states would have a legal obligation to raise
the welfare of their populations, or to try to do so, and other states would have the
obligation to pressure or help low-welfare states to live up to their welfarist obligations.
As a practical matter, the effect of this treaty would be to divide the world into
high-welfare states that comply with the law and low-welfare states that do not. The highwelfare states would pressure the low-welfare states to adopt better policies or reward
them for doing so. Technically, the current human rights regime does not make such a
clear demarcation between human-rights respecters and human-rights abusers. Humanrights respecters violate human rights treaties if they occasionally deviate from the law,
whereas high-welfare states would violate the welfarist treaty only if they adopted
disastrous policies. However, the pressure brought to bear on traditional human-rights
16

respecters who occasionally deviate is small, and so the differences between the two
systems in this respect would be minimal. The advantage of the welfarist approach is that
it would bring the legal regime into line with practice, as well as with the pragmatic
assumption that scarce international resources should be used against the worst states, not
states that are generally good or marginally bad.
Consider two examples of how the welfarist approach would change our thinking
about the responsibilities of states for abuses that occur on their soil.
First, consider China. The Chinese government violates human rights. It
suppresses political dissent, censors the press, deprives people of fair trials, and harasses
religious minorities. Yet this authoritarian government is also responsible for the greatest
enhancement of human welfare in recent history. Since 1978 hundreds of millions of
Chinese moved from extreme poverty to a reasonably comfortable existence. As long as
the Chinese government continues to improve the well-being of so many people, states
that care about welfare should refrain from pressuring China to improve its human rights
record. With respect to all the welfare indicators to be discussed shortly, China scores
well.
Second, consider the current international controversy over the death penalty.
Many countries have abolished the death penalty and criticize the United States for
retaining it. Human rights organization also pressure the United States to abolish the
death penalty. In terms of the analytic framework advanced by this paper, a portion of the
common fund devoted to improving human rights practices is being channeled toward
American death penalty abolition. Is this a good use of these resources?
The answer is no. First, capital punishment in the United States results in only a
few dozen deaths per year—53 in 2006, down from a high of 98 in 1999 (over the last 30
years).44 These executions might deter other killings, but even assuming that they do
not,45 the loss of life is trivial compared to the scale of other humanitarian catastrophes
occurring around the world. For example, in Darfur there have been tens of thousands
deaths per year.46 Resources would be better used, at the margin, to set up refugee camps
44

See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions Per Year (2007), available at
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and provide humanitarian relief in Darfur, than to pressure the United States to abolish
the death penalty.
Second, the United States appears to be impervious to pressure from foreign
countries to abolish the death penalty. Most executions are carried out by state
governments, which play virtually no role in American foreign relations, and have a great
deal of constitutional discretion over their criminal justice systems. One state—Texas—
executed 24 people in 2006, nearly five times the number in the state with the next most
executions.47 Texas and other states can cater to xenophobic sentiments of their citizens
without worrying about the foreign relations consequences. Resources used to pressure
state governments to cut back on the death penalty, or to pressure the federal government
to pressure the state governments, are thus unlikely to have any effect. By contrast,
resources used to pressure smaller, weaker countries where significant human rights
abuses occur are more likely to have an effect.
Human rights treaties do no distinguish between the United States and Sudan.48
Both states have an obligation to comply with human rights norms. Because the treaties
do not provide a formula for limiting or balancing human rights, they give no guidance to
interested states as to how to allocate resources in a manner that maximizes their effect.
As a result, human rights enforcement is largely ad hoc. By contrast, a welfarist treaty
directs states to focus on particular states, those with the lowest level of welfare: Sudan,
not the United States.
One might argue that a sufficiently specific welfarist treaty would not command
universal assent because different societies have different notions of the good life. Of
course, the same argument has been made about human rights, and, as I have argued, the
problem seems to be more significant for human rights than for welfare. The welfarist
approach, however, has an advantage over the human rights approach. If welfare can be
specified at a high enough level of generality, then states are free to choose whatever
mechanisms they believe will best promote welfare. Such mechanisms can draw on local
traditions and practices that are at variance with human rights norms—as long as the
government can make the case that they improve rather than diminish welfare.
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See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note __, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf.
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However, developing states have argued that compliance with human rights treaties should be judged in
light of “capacities,” an argument reflected in, for example, the General Assembly resolution that created
the Human Rights Council. See UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/251, para. 5(e) (2006).
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B. Approaches
1. Desiderata
The goal is to encourage states to pressure governments to improve well-being.
This goal can be implemented in many ways. Here, I describe three desiderata.
Government responsiveness to pressure. States should put pressure—diplomatic,
economic, military (in the extreme)—on other states that fail to adopt welfarist policies.
States should not punish states that have miserable populations when their misery cannot
be attributed to government policy. However, in practice it may be difficult to determine
whether the population’s misery is due to government misconduct or to circumstances
that are outside the government’s control. To the extent that governments can be
responsive to pressure in general, then a “strict liability” approach is superior, one that
looks only at the conditions of the population and not at the activities of the government.
To the extent that governments cannot respond to pressure, then an approach that focuses
on government behavior and motivations is more appropriate.
To capture this point, let us distinguish between responsive governments and
nonresponsive governments. Aid should flow to nonresponsive governments as long as a
large enough portion reaches the population. For responsive governments, low-welfare
states should be pressured and marginally higher-welfare states should be rewarded. The
reason is that the governments of low-welfare states must be given incentives to adopt
welfare-promoting policies when officials, for personal or political reasons, or out of
incompetence, are otherwise inclined. If governments know that they will receive aid (or
avoid pressure) regardless of whether they adopt welfare-promoting policies, then they
have no incentive to adopt such policies.
If this point seems paradoxical, one should understood that it is not special to the
welfarist regime; it applies to the human rights regime as well. Governments pressure the
worst human-rights abusers by depriving them of aid, imposing economic sanctions, and
occasionally invading them—in all of these ways usually making the population worse
off rather than better off, because human-rights abusing governments make sure that their
populations feel the sting. As human rights improve, governments reward the country in
question by extending aid, entering trade agreements, and so forth. Thus, the
governments that engage in less human rights abuse, and whose populations are therefore
better off from a human rights perspective, are rewarded.49
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Precision. It is sometimes argued that treaties with precise obligations are easier
to enforce than treaties with vague obligations.50 If obligations are vague, then
governments can easily rationalize violations. Moreover, if governments that are injured
by violations have trouble agreeing among themselves as to whether the violations
actually occurred, whether they were serious, and so forth, they will be unable to
responded with a united front. The goal of a welfarist treaty is to promote welfare.
Welfare is a contested concept. Thus, a treaty that simply required states to promote the
welfare of their citizens would be vague, and hence vulnerable to opportunistic breach.
For this reason, it may be appropriate to choose more precise treaty obligations even
though they do not fully capture whatever is meant by welfare.
Availability of data. A workable treaty regime requires behavior that is
verifiable.51 States do not enter arms control agreements unless they can verify that the
other side is not producing the restricted arms. Many human rights treaties require
government behavior that is relatively easy to observe, at least in open societies. If torture
occurs, witnesses and victims can come forward with testimony and evidence. A welfarist
treaty suffers by comparison: welfare is not directly observable. For a welfarist treaty to
function, reliable proxies for welfare must be developed.
2. Welfare
A very simple treaty could provide as follows: “Each state party has the
obligation to promote the welfare of its people.” Two objections can be made. First, no
one can agree on what “welfare” means, and therefore the obligation would be empty.
Second, it is impossible to tell whether a state has satisfied its obligation because
promoting welfare would be an affirmative duty, and could not be discharged simply (as
in the case of negative duties) by refraining from engaging in a particular act.
As to the first objection, a large philosophical literature on welfarism suggests
that welfare can be understood in three general ways. Mental state theorists, like
Bentham, argue that welfare refers to hedonic affect—the felt experience of being happy,
satisfied, well-off, etc. For a long time, people argued that hedonic affect cannot be
measured, but recent advances in psychology and economics suggest otherwise.52 Desirebased theorists argue that welfare refers to the satisfaction of desires. Within this group,
there is disagreement about whether satisfaction of desires improves welfare regardless of
50
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Norbert Schwarz, eds. 2003).
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what those desires are (a view taken by most economists) or only if those desires meet
further criteria—for example, being well-informed and undistorted by circumstances.53
Objective-list theorists, like Martha Nussbaum, argue that welfare refers to the enjoyment
of certain objective goods, such as health, education, personal relationships, and
recreation.54 Here, too, a great deal of disagreement exists about which activities count as
objective goods.55
Despite the disagreement between and within the camps, a consensus about, at
least, the minimum requirements of welfare probably exists. Nearly everyone agrees that
basic health care advances welfare—because healthier people are happier, or because
people desire good health, or because health is an objective good. The various approaches
tend to come into conflict over more esoteric questions—for example, whether people
who overeat and become obese should be counted as better off (they satisfy desires) or
worse off (they do not satisfy informed desires, or they are not happy).
The second objection has been much discussed in the context of ordinary human
rights treaties. Delicate judgments must be made as to how far a state must go in order to
satisfy positive rights such as the right to work, which is contained in the ICESCR.
Indeed, it is doubtful that the distinction between positive and negative rights has
practical importance.56 Consider the negative right not to be tortured. No state can reduce
the incidence of torture to zero. Local police or soldiers will always contain rogue
elements who torture even when torture is not official policy. To reduce the amount of
torture, a government must not only pass laws against torture. It must instruct lower-level
officials not to engage in torture, train them, monitor them, and make available resources
to investigate, prosecute, and punish those who violate the law. Torture will always
occur, so the relevant question is how much a government must invest in reducing torture
before it can be deemed to comply with a rule against torture. The inquiry is no easier
than the positive-right inquiry regarding how much a government must invest in
promoting literacy before it complies with a right to education. Seen in this way, the
distinction between negative rights and positive rights collapses.
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Nonetheless, the first objection is hard to quarrel with. No one, analogously,
thinks that it would be better to have a single human rights treaty that required states to
respect “human rights” than to have more complex treaties that spell out, with some
detail, the various obligations, in terms of detention, speech, freedom of conscience, and
so forth. For this reason, I will move on to more detailed welfare treaties.
3. Gross Domestic Product
I start with per capita GDP. Although per capita GDP is not a plausible measure
of welfare, it is frequently used as a measure of well-being in academic research, and so it
provides a useful baseline for thinking about welfarist measures. Table 2 lists the bottom
40 states by per capita GDP, plus that of the United States.
57

Table 2: Per Capita GDP
Country Name
Liberia
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Eritrea
Cambodia
Afghanistan
Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau
Ethiopia
Somalia
Burundi
Madagascar
Togo
Niger
Central African Republic
Malawi
United Republic of Tanzania
Gambia
Bhutan
Chad
Zambia
Uganda
Yemen
Mali
Burkina Faso
Sudan
Rwanda
Kenya

Per capita GDP
366
446
564
616
626
630
639
704
731
787
833
845
883
952
973
991
1000
1001
1037
1065
1183
1185
1238
1240
1254
1278
1295
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Nigeria
Iraq
Benin
Sao Tome and Principe
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Kiribati
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Nepal
Comoros
Mongolia
Republic of Congo
Mauritania

1295
1314
1374
1471
1512
1525
1527
1537
1629
1643
1680
1688

United States

37,313

Treaty designers would need to make some complex choices about how a
welfarist treaty would use the per capita GDP measure. It would make little sense to
require that all states achieve a certain per capita GDP, such as the world median. Very
poor states would have no chance to comply with the treaty. Either the median would
shift over time, condemning half the states to treaty violation, or the target would need to
be fixed with reference to a particular year. Both approaches seem arbitrary. A possible
alternative would require states to hit certain targets that take into account their starting
point—for example, a moving average growth rate for per capita GDP over a period of
years. States would have an obligation to improve welfare rather than to reach a certain
level of welfare. States that comply with the treaty would eventually become wealthy
enough that they could be released from further growth obligations unless per capita GDP
again dips to an unacceptably low level. Further, by setting the target as an average over a
period of years, one avoids penalizing states that are hit by random shocks such as
economic downturns. States would be free to choose among methods that promote
economic growth, which allow them to take into account local conditions. Some states
might find it easy to reduce trade barriers; others might prefer to invest in infrastructure
or to strengthen property rights.
Per capita GDP has some normative appeal and practical advantages. For the
desire-based theorist who relies on raw preferences (the conventional economist’s view),
per capita GDP provides a rough measure of welfare. Higher per capita GDP means that
more goods and services are being consumed; because people want goods and services,
an increase in consumption of goods and services would seem to indicate an increase in
welfare. A desire-based theorist who gives moral weight only to informed or otherwise
restricted preferences would be more uneasy about per capita GDP but might be satisfied
with this measure as long as laws ensure that people are sufficiently informed. Consumer
protection laws, for example, might serve this function. Similarly, hedonic and objectivegoods theorists might think that per capita GDP is a rough proxy for welfare as long as
23

people spend their money on improving their happiness (in the first case) or on objective
goods (in the second). Again, laws can channel people’s behavior in these directions. An
important qualification of this argument is that if marginal utility declines with wealth,
overall welfare will be higher in states with greater equality of income and wealth. For
per capita GDP to be an accurate measure of welfare, it should probably be adjusted
using a conventional measure of equality such as the Gini coefficient.
The main advantage of the per capita GDP measure is that data are readily
available for most countries, which allow for easy comparison and ranking. On the other
hand, uncertainty would be introduced for countries with large underground economies,
which would need to be estimated. In addition, measuring equality is difficult; the Gini
coefficient is only one of many possible measures; and even if it is accepted, there
remains the question how much weight would be given to it. Thus, per capita GDP turns
out to be unacceptably crude or must be supplemented with data that are extremely hard
to find and measure.
Another objection to the use of per capita GDP is that it would make poor states
the exclusive target of international pressure, which would be unfair. But if poor states
are poor because of corrupt or incompetent governments, then such pressure is justified
as a way of encouraging reform. Indeed, the same thing could be said about the
international human rights regime, which, in practice, focuses on poor states because
poor states are usually the worst human rights violators. Human rights campaigners
frequently argue that foreign aid should be withheld from human-rights abusing states; as
a practical matter, this would mean withholding foreign aid from very poor states that
need it most. Further, the welfarist treaty would not require states to pressure poor states
whose governments lack capacity to change. In such cases, a welfarist treaty would
require aid, rather than pressure, as long as aid is likely to improve the well-being of the
population in question.
4. Happiness Measures
A second approach to drafting a welfarist treaty would exploit recent social
science research on the measurement of subjective well-being. Economists and
psychologists have discovered that people answer happiness surveys in a consistent
manner that satisfies tests of external validity. A group of scholars argues that the results
of these surveys provide a useful measure of subjective happiness.58 A typical survey
question asks the respondent how happy she is on a scale from 1 to 5 or 1 to 10. A
random sample of the population of a country can be given the survey, and the average
response provides a rough measure of the welfare level of the country as a whole. Table 3
58
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lists the bottom 40 countries. Note that most of the countries in Table 2, above, are
omitted because of the absence of data, not because they are necessarily happy places; we
do not know how they would rank if surveys had been conducted in those countries.
59

Table 3: Life Satisfaction
Country
Satisfaction with Life
Tanzania
3.87
Zimbabwe
3.94
Armenia
4.32
Bulgaria
4.41
Ukraine
4.56
Moldova
4.57
Georgia
4.68
Belarus
4.81
Pakistan
4.86
Russia
4.88
Macedonia
5.12
Iraq
5.23
Egypt
5.36
Azerbaijan
5.39
Lithuania
5.41
Latvia
5.54
Turkey
5.59
Serbia and Montenegro
5.62
Uganda
5.62
Jordan
5.65
Algeria
5.67
Slovakia
5.67
Romania
5.75
Bangladesh
5.77
Bosnia and Herzegovina
5.77
South Africa
5.81
Estonia
5.85
Hungary
5.94
Portugal
5.97
Morocco
6.05
Poland
6.17
Republic of Korea
6.21
Iran
6.38
Peru
6.44
Croatia
6.46
Japan
6.48
Kyrgyzstan
6.48
Czech Republic
6.49
Vietnam
6.52

Year of survey
2001
2001
1997
2003
1999
2000
1996
2000
2001
1999
2001
2004
2000
1996
2003
2003
2003
2001
2001
2001
2002
2003
2005
2002
2001
2001
2003
2003
2003
2001
2003
2001
2000
2001
1999
2000
2003
2003
2001
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122D / 10-step numeral Life Satisfaction. The survey question was: All things considered, how satisfied are
you with your life as a whole now? 1- dissatisfied and 10 – satisfied.
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The mean score was 6.5; Colombia enjoyed the highest score (8.2). The United States
had a score of 7.6.
As a generalization, happier countries tend to be wealthier, but exceptions
abound. Nigeria (6.87), for example, is very poor but has an average happiness greater
than that of Greece (6.78), Poland (6.17), and Portugal (5.97)—all relatively wealthy
countries. Uganda (5.62) is happier than Ukraine (4.56), Russia (4.88), and Turkey
(5.59), which are middle-income countries. Thus, Uganda and Nigeria would probably be
in compliance with a welfarist treaty that used happiness measures but not a welfarist
treaty that used per capita GDP, while the opposite could be true for Ukraine and Russia.
Tanzania is unhappy and poor, and would be in violation of either type of welfarist treaty.
The United States, wealthy and happy, would violate neither type of treaty.
A happiness treaty, like a per capita GDP treaty, would need to have targets.
States that have happiness levels above a certain level would be in compliance with the
treaty; other states would be required to achieve a designated growth rate over a period of
years.
Happiness studies are controversial and raise numerous questions. Some critics
argue that self-reported happiness is not the same as real happiness; people’s survey
responses might reflect cultural norms rather than subjective well-being. There is also a
great deal of controversy about the moral status of happiness or life satisfaction.60 Still,
the happiness measure has advantages. For the mental state theorist, happiness measures
surely approximate welfare better than per capita GDP does. Even the desire-based
theorist might endorse the happiness measure, especially if she fears that per capita GDP
reflects distorted rather than restricted or ideal preferences. Although people with
informed desires might prefer other things besides happiness, the happiness measure
might be a sufficient approximation of desire-based welfare. For the objective-list
theorist, the value of the happiness measure depends on whether people who enjoy
objective goods tend to be happier than other people. If they do, a happiness measure
might suffice; if not, it will not. The evidence suggests that happiness is correlated with
many items on standard objective lists, including health, education, and life expectancy.61
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See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis, J. Legal Stud.
(forthcoming 2008), for a discussion.
61
See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics 24-44 (2002).
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5. Objective Social Ills
Martha Nussbaum lists the following objective goods: life; bodily health; bodily
integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation
(including the goods of both friendship and self-respect); play; other species; and control
over one’s environment (including both political rights and property rights).62 Others
have provided similar lists.63 For our purposes, the most significant challenge posed by
such lists is that of converting them into standards against which a state’s activities can
be measured.64
This challenge has two elements. First, each objective good must be converted
into a scale. In some cases, this is not difficult. “Life” becomes mortality or life
expectancy; “bodily health” can be captured with measures of morbidity or health care
expenses. “Play” poses more difficult challenges, but could conceivably be approximated
with measures of leisure time. Second, the goods need to be placed on a single metric.
Otherwise, we have no way to compare a state that scores well on life expectancy and
poorly on control over one’s environment and a state that scores poorly on life
expectancy and well on control over one’s environment.
Various scholars and organizations have made progress with both these problems.
Development agencies gather cross-country statistics on longevity, infant mortality,
health, education, and other variables related to objective goods. Table 4 lists some of
these development indicators for the 40 poorest countries, 10 middle-income countries,
and 10 rich countries.
65

Country
Liberia

GDP
per
capita
366

Table 4: Objective Indicators
Human
Life
Infant
Adult
Literacy
Develop- ExpecMorRate (%
ment
tancy at
tality
Index
Birth
Rate
ages >14)

Net
Primary
Enrollment
Ratio
66

Health
Expenditure
Per Capita
(PPP US $)
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See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 78–80 (2000).
See, e.g., the WHO’s quality of life index; for a discussion see Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A
Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U L. Rev. 1875, 1961–63 (2006).
64
What follows is an extremely rough sketch. For much more sophisticated work in this vein, see Sabina
Alkire, Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction (2002). There is now a large
literature on social indicators with its own journal entitled Social Indicators Research. For a recent critical
survey, see Amal Kanti Ray, Measurement of Social Development: An International Comparison, 86 Soc.
Indicators Res. 1 (2001).
65
Source: United Nations Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power,
Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/. All data
are from 2004 except Health Expenditure Per Capita (2003). Blank cells where data were not collected by
the cited sources.
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Congo
Eritrea
Cambodia
Afghanistan
Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau
Ethiopia
Somalia
Burundi
Madagascar
Togo
Niger
Central African Rep.
Malawi
Tanzania
Gambia
Bhutan
Chad
Zambia
Uganda
Yemen
Mali
Burkina Faso
Sudan
Rwanda
Kenya
Nigeria
Iraq
Benin
Sao Tome and
Principe
Laos
Kiribati
North Korea
Nepal
Comoros
Mongolia
Congo, Republic of
Mauritania
Mozambique
Croatia
Argentina
Slovakia
Latvia
Lithuania
Russia

446
564
616
626
630
639
704
731
787
833
845
883
952
973
991
1000
1001
1037
1065
1183
1185
1238
1240
1254
1278
1295
1295
1314
1374
1471

0.391
0.454
0.583

43.5
54.3
56.5

129
52
97

67.2

0.335
0.349
0.371

41
44.8
47.8

165
126
110

0.384
0.509
0.495
0.311
0.353
0.4
0.43
0.479
0.538
0.368
0.407
0.502
0.492
0.338
0.342
0.516
0.45
0.491
0.448

44
55.6
54.5
44.6
39.1
39.8
45.9
56.1
63.4
43.7
37.7
48.4
61.1
48.1
47.9
56.5
44.2
47.5
43.4

114
76
78
152
115
110
78
89
67
117
102
80
82
121
97
63
118
79
101

0.428
0.607

54.3
63.2

90
75

74.1
34.7
83.1

73.6
28.1
35.1

59.3
70.7
53.2
28.7
48.6
64.1
69.4
47
25.7
68
66.8
19
21.8
60.9
64.9
73.6

48
98

14
50
188

45
46

34
45
20

57
89
79
39

15
24
62
30
47
46
29
96
59
51
51
75
89
39
68
54
32
65
51

95
86
75
57
80
75
46
40
43
73
76
60
88
83
98

36
93

1512
1525
1527
1537
1629
1643
1680
1686
1700

0.553

55.1

65

68.7

84
97

25

0.527
0.556
0.691
0.52
0.486
0.39

62.1
63.7
64.5
52.3
53.1
41.6

59
52
41
81
78
104

48.6

78
55
84

64
25
140
23
59
45

10,613
11,438
11,549
11,739
12,085
12,218

0.846
0.863
0.856
0.845
0.857
0.797

75.2
74.6
74.3
71.8
72.5
65.2

6
16
6
10
8
17

97.8
51.2

74
71

98.1
97.2
100
99.7
99.6
99.4

87
99

89
91

838
1067
777
678
754
551
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Seychelles
Chile
Malaysia
Belarus

12,641
13,263
13,318
13,606

0.842
0.859
0.805
0.794

72.7
78.1
73.4
68.2

12
8
10
9

Netherlands
Ireland
Austria
Canada
Denmark
Australia
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
Norway
USA

28,256
29,398
29,722
29,776
29,935
30,591
31,298
33,363
34,528
37,313

0.947
0.956
0.944
0.95
0.943
0.957
0.947
0.839
0.965
0.948

78.5
77.9
79.2
80.2
77.3
80.5
80.7
78.3
79.6
77.5

5
5
5
5
4
5
5
7
4
7

91.8
95.7
88.7
99.6

96

599
707
374
570

93
90
99
96
99
100
96
94
71
99
92

2987
2496
2306
2989
2762
2874
3776
623
3809
5711

Life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, enrollment, and health expenditure per
capita are all reasonable measures of life, health, practical reason, and other objective
goods. But none can serve on its own as a measure of objective well-being, and thus an
aggregative index would need to be developed. The Human Development Index (column
1) is a weighted average of per capita GDP, life expectancy, and enrollment in primary,
secondary, and tertiary schools.66 Some poor states, such as Cambodia and Madagascar,
have higher scores for objective indicators than wealthier states, such as Benin and
Mauritania—and so Cambodia and Madagascar could be in compliance with an
objective-list welfarist treaty that Benin and Mauritania would violate.
Other combinations and weightings can be imagined, which leads to the fear that
any such index would be arbitrary.67 However, there is a great deal of consistency across
categories of objective indicators, which creates hope that a reasonable index can be
identified. It would then be necessary to establish a treaty obligation in terms of a state’s
location on the index or its progress toward a higher level. As I have discussed this point
in connection with the per capita GDP and happiness measures, further discussion here is
unnecessary.
6. Democracy
One might choose not to focus on indicators of a population’s well-being and
instead focus on indicators of government quality. Some states might be poor because of
66

By including per capita GDP, the HDI combines the subjective (desire-based) and objective approach to
well-being.
67
See T. N. Srinivasan, Human Development: A New Paradigm or Reinvention of the Wheel?, 84 Amer.
Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 239 (1994); and for Sen’s response, Sen, supra note __ at 79-81.
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bad governments while other states are poor because of natural disadvantages, including
a history of civil conflict or bad government, which the current government cannot
overcome. Pressure should be put only on the governments of the first type of state. Thus,
the human welfare treaty should oblige the world to pressure bad governments of lowwelfare states (or perhaps bad governments of any state), while tolerating or aiding states
that have relatively good governments even if low welfare levels.
What might such a treaty look like? A simple approach would be a democracy
treaty, one that required all states to be democracies. Although I do not think that this
approach has much to recommend it, it provides a useful baseline for examining more
complex approaches.
The theory of such a treaty has two premises. First, democracy reliably leads to
welfare improvements for the population. The argument for such a view is that
democratic governments need the support of most of the population, while authoritarian
governments rely on the support only of an elite or tribe or other small segment of the
population. Therefore, democracies distribute welfare broadly, while authoritarian states
distribute welfare narrowly.68 However, the empirical evidence for this argument is
slim.69
Second, pressure on authoritarian states reliably results in transitions to
democracy. Although this proposition seems intuitive plausible, the evidence is even
weaker than it is for the first proposition. The experience with Iraq provides a cautionary
tale. Economic sanctions on Iraq during the 1990s did not weaken the authoritarian
system; and the recent war in Iraq has not delivered a democracy. For these reasons, a
welfarist treaty that required states to pressure authoritarian states with the view of
encouraging democracy would probably be ill-advised.
Nonetheless, it is worth looking at the data. Political scientists have classified
states according to their degree of democratization, with a score of zero signifying an
authoritarian state and a score of 10 signifying the highest level of democracy. The
United States and other western countries receive a score of 10; North Korea receives a 0.
Among the 40 poorest countries, many (including North Korea) lack democracy: Eritrea,
Gambia, Bhutan, Uganda, and Sudan receive 0; many others receive 1 or another low

68

See Casey B. Mulligan, Ricard Gil, & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Do Democracies Have Different Public
Policies Than Nondemocracies?, 18 J. Econ. Perspectives 51 (2004).
69
Id.
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score. Yet there are some democracies, including Mongolia (10), Kenya (8), Malawi (7),
and Madagascar (7).70
An approach that stresses democracy, then, would require western states to
provide aid to Mongolia and the other democracies, while denying aid to, and imposing
pressure on, Eritrea and the other authoritarian states. Presumably wealthy democracies
would receive no aid, but they would also receive no pressure even if they violate human
rights. Other authoritarian states would receive pressure regardless of whether they are
rich or poor, and regardless of whether they respect or violate other human rights.71
7. Government Corruption
Democratic states often have bad governments and authoritarian states can
arguably have good governments. A treaty regime might thus focus not on the type of
government but the quality of governance. Relevant indicators of quality might include
the ratio of tax revenues to the value of government services, the speed and integrity of
the legal system, and the level of government corruption. I will focus on this last
indicator here.
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures “the degree of public sector
corruption as perceived by business people and country analysts.”72 The score ranges
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (clean). A welfarist treaty would require states to pressure
highly corrupt states, regardless of whether they are democracies (such as Mongolia (10
on democracy, 3 on CPI)) or authoritarian regimes (such as Eritrea, (0 and 2.6)); whether
they are relatively wealthy (such as Belarus (3.3)) or poor; whether their people are
happy (such as Nigeria (1.6)) or unhappy. Table 5 provides more data. If the world turned
its attention from the 20 poorest countries to the 20 most corrupt countries, then
Madagascar and Mali (among others) would be removed from the list, and Bangladesh,
Azerbaijan, and Paraguay (among others) would be added to it. The theory is that
corruption prevents welfare gains; so if countries were forced or encouraged to reduce
corruption, welfare would increase.
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See Monty G. Marshall & Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2004, available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/.
71
Some scholars appear to take this view, but it is unclear how they reconcile it with the human rights
approach.
72
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2007, available at:
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/24104/360217.
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Rank
1

4
6
7
9
11
12
14
15
16
17
19
20
150

162

168

172

175
177
73

Table 5: Corruption Perception Index73
State
New Zealand
9.4
Denmark
9.4
Finland
9.4
Singapore
9.3
Sweden
9.3
Iceland
9.2
Netherlands
9.0
Switzerland
9.0
Norway
8.7
Canada
8.7
Australia
8.6
Luxembourg
8.4
United Kingdom
8.4
Hong Kong
8.3
Austria
8.1
Germany
7.8
Japan
7.5
Ireland
7.5
France
7.3
USA
7.2
Sierra Leone
Kazakhstan
Belarus
Zimbabwe
Côte d´Ivoire
Tajikistan
Liberia
Rep. of Congo
Ecuador
Azerbaijan
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan
Bangladesh
Papua New Guinea
Turkmenistan
Central African Republic
Cambodia
Venezuela
Laos
Equatorial Guinea
Guinea
Dem. Rep. of Congo
Afghanistan
Sudan
Chad
Uzbekistan
Tonga
Haiti

CPI

2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.7
1.7
1.6

Source: Id.

32

178
179

Iraq
Somalia
Myanmar

1.5
1.4
1.4

Although many scholars believe that corruption interferes with development and
hence well-being, this view is controversial.74 Indeed, it seems perverse to pressure
corrupt countries which do well on the various welfare indicators. At least for some
countries, corruption might not interfere excessively with the delivery of public services
to the population. A compromise approach would be to target only countries that are both
corrupt and low in welfare.
8. Aggregative Indices
If none of the measures described above seems satisfactory alone, one might
propose combining them into an aggregate index. Doing so would be extremely difficult,
however, as we would need to decide how much weight to give each measure (as well as
other possible measures that I have not discussed). There is no a priori reason, for
example, to give equal weighting to, say, corruption and happiness. And a person who
believes that the happiness measure is the philosophically correct approach would reject
weighting any of the objective measures, unless they happen to correlate with happiness.
The Human Development Index, which gives weight to per capita GDP, life expectancy,
and schooling, seems similarly arbitrary.75
Still, this problem can potentially be evaded. Suppose, for example, that we can
identify a group of states that do poorly on all of our measures. These states might
justifiably be considered the worst offenders against human well-being, and the
governments of other states ought to pressure or help them to improve their performance.
Which are the lowest-welfare states in this sense? To compile a list, I examined
the 20 poorest states, and among them chose those that appear in the bottom 20 (or more
if there are ties) of the following indicators: democracy, corruption, life expectancy, and
adult literacy. States that appear three or more times for these indicators are: Democratic
Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Niger, Central African Republic, Bhutan, and Chad.76
So we might agree—in the sense of developing an overlapping consensus—that
these states are plausible candidates for foreign pressure on welfarist grounds. They have
low-welfare populations (on most measures) and they have bad governments (on most
74

See International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed. 2007).
For an alternative approach, see Ray, supra. Ray’s “social development index” includes additional factors
and uses alternative weightings.
76
However, Bhutan scores an impressive 7.26 on the happiness index, well above the mean of 6.5. See
source for Table 2, supra.
75
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measures). A welfarist treaty, then, might require states to pressure these states, or a
larger group of low-welfare states.
9. Summary
The various welfare measures described above are offered more as a thought
experiment than as a definite proposal for reform. If one or more of them seem plausible,
then a case can be made for replacing human rights treaties with welfare treaties or (more
realistically) amending the human rights treaties or construing them in a manner that
allows states to maximize the welfare of their populations when formulating policy.
If the welfare measures instead strike one as absurd or perplexing, then the
prospects of a welfare treaty may be dim. However, by the same token the ICESCR and
other treaties that advance positive rights would need to be discarded. Treaties that
require behavior that cannot be measured against a standard of conduct are empty vessels.
And if I am correct that the negative right is just a species of the positive right, because
complying with negative rights requires states to allocate resources to specific programs
rather than simply refraining from doing some act, then the absence of such measures
should discredit the negative rights treaties as well. For the ICCPR to function, for
example, it must be possible for states to be able to complain that other states have not
devoted enough resources to stamping out unlawful detentions. But to be able to make
that complaint, states must be able to prove that those resources do not have a better use.
C. A Pragmatic Defense of the Welfarist Approach
Human rights advocates, especially those committed to vindicating negative
rights, will not be persuaded that a welfarist approach could be defensible. The notion
that a government could legitimately put resources into economic growth or health care
or security rather than eliminating torture is, at best, highly controversial. However, there
is another argument in favor of the welfarist approach to which they should be more
open, which is that a welfarist approach will have the indirect effect of promoting respect
for negative rights.
The argument rests on a political science chestnut that people in wealthier
societies have the means to demand that their government respect negative rights.77
77

See Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate, & Linda Camp Keith, Repression of the Human Right to Personal
Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 Int’l Stud. Q. 291,
305 (1999) (finding economic standing and democracy to be associated with a statistically significant and
effect on respect for human rights); Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal
Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 853 (1994) (similar); Claire Apodaca,
Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights after the Cold War, 45 Int’l Stud. Q. 587, 600
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Whether the government approves or not, wealth brings education, literacy, familiarity
with practices in foreign lands, better ability to organize, the development of civil society,
and so forth—and these factors contribute to a rights-respecting culture. The evidence is
consistent with this claim. Table 6 lists ratings states have received for political rights and
civil liberties (Freedom House), and political terror (Amnesty International and U.S. State
Department). The political and civil rights scores range from 1 to 7, with lower numbers
representing greater freedoms. The political terror scores range from 1 to 5, with lower
numbers referring to less political terror. These extremely crude ratings are the best
approximation that we have of a state’s compliance with human rights norms in the area
of civil and political rights.
78

Country Name
Liberia
Dem. Rep. Congo
Eritrea
Cambodia
Afghanistan
Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau
Ethiopia
Somalia
Burundi
Madagascar
Togo
Niger
Central Afr. Rep.
Malawi
Tanzania
Gambia
Bhutan
Chad
Zambia
Croatia

GDP (PPP)
(2003)
366
446
564
616
626
630
639
704
731
787
833
845
883
952
973
991
1000
1001
1037
1065
10,613

Table 6: Political Freedoms
Freedom
Freedom
House Political
House Civil
Rights
Liberties
3
4
5
6
7
6
6
5
5
5
4
3
4
4
5
5
7
7
4
5
4
3
6
5
3
3
5
4
3
4
4
3
5
4
6
5
6
6
3
4
2

2

Political Terror
Amnesty Int’l
Score

2
3

Political Terror
US State Dept
Score
3
4
3
3
5
3
3
4
4
5
2
4
2
4
3
3
2
1
4
3

2

2

3
5
3
3
5
2
2
4
4
4
5
2
3
3
3

(2001) (concluding that globalization serves as an engine of economic growth that in turn has a positive
impact on states’ human rights records). Others have made the point that policies that increase the wealth of
other nations will likely improve human rights in those nations as well; see, e.g., Fernando R. Tesón, Trade
and Global Justice 14-15 (unpub. m.s. 2005) (arguing that free trade policies would improve human rights).
78
Sources:
Freedom
House,
available
at:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=15&year=2007. Political terror scales compiled from Amnesty International and State
Department data by Mark Gibney and Matthew Dalton, available at: http://www.unca.edu/
politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-staff/gibney.html.

35

Argentina
Slovakia
Latvia
Lithuania
Russia
Seychelles
Chile
Malaysia
Belarus

11,438
11,549
11,739
12,085
12,218
12,641
13,263
13,318
13,606

2
1
1
1
6
3
1
4
7

2
1
1
1
5
3
1
4
6

2
1
2
1
4

Netherlands
Ireland
Austria
Canada
Denmark
Australia
Switzerland
UAE
Norway
USA

28,256
29,398
29,722
29,776
29,935
30,591
31,298
33,363
34,528
37,313

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
1

1
1
2
1

2
1
2
1
4
1
1
2
2

1
3
3

1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1

1
2
2
3

The lesson of this table is that, with isolated albeit important exceptions, wealthier states
have stronger political and civil rights and lower levels of political terror. Indeed, all of
the welfare measures are highly correlated, and so wealth, happiness, objective measures
of well-being, and democracy are also correlated with respect for human rights.79 By
contrast, ratification of human rights treaties does not appear to lead to improvement in
human rights.
The limited empirical research that has been conducted establishes correlation,
not causation.80 Suppose that some omitted variable—“culture” or special historical
circumstances or some such thing—causes some states both to become wealthy and to
respect rights. If so, an international policy of pressuring states to improve welfare will
have no effect on wealth, welfare, and human rights. The tentative case for focusing on
economic growth and other welfare measures as a means for improving human rights,
then, rests on an implicit theory that (1) aid and pressure can cause other states to become
wealthier, and (2) increasing wealth causes populations to demand that their governments
respect human rights. The case has not yet been made, but it may well be sound.81

79

See Poe, Tate, & Keith, supra note __, at 305.
Id.
81
This conclusion is, in fact, old-fashioned conventional wisdom that was influentially criticized by Sen,
supra, and others. This wisdom deserves a second look.
80
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III. The Relationship with Foreign Aid
Most poor states, and many middle-income states, receive significant foreign
aid—much of it intended to improve the well-being of the poor, and much of it designed
to serve strategic or political interests of the donors. At one time, donor nations did not
expect that recipient nations would necessarily comply with human rights treaties, but in
recent years there has emerged a norm of “rights-based development” that insists that aid
must be sensitive to the human rights practices of the recipient state.82 When an aid
recipient abuses human rights, advocates frequently argue that aid should be withheld.
This response has been institutionalized: many international agencies, such as the IMF,
condition assistance on adequate human rights performance.83 Many countries take this
position as well. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, a U.S. government entity, sends
aid to countries that score above the median for a group of indicators for political rights,
educational investment, economic freedom, and corruption.84
This approach is in tension with the usual justification for foreign aid, which is to
help the worst-off populations. Most of the poorest people in the world live in states that
violate human rights. When states withdraw aid from human-rights abusing governments,
they risk further impoverishing the people whose rights are being violated.
This policy can be given two justifications. First, one might hope that the
withdrawal of foreign aid will hurt government officials rather than the public.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to ensure that aid flows reach their intended recipients;
they must usually go through government intermediaries who can skim off a portion of
the proceeds. Thus, except in unusual circumstances, reducing aid will hurt populations
and not (or not just) officials.85
Second, states will improve their human rights practices only if their governments
believe they will be rewarded for doing so. If aid is given to poor states regardless of their
human rights practices, then states will have no incentive to stop abuse. As an unfortunate
82

The idea appears to have originated with Sen, supra note __, and it has since been endorsed by many
scholars and international institutions. See, e.g., Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development
(2004);UNDP, Human Rights and Development, Human Development Report (2000); United Nations, The
Human Rights-Based Approach To Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among
UN Agencies, in Report of the Second Interagency Workshop on Implementing a Human Rights-Based
Approach in the Context of UN Reform (2003).
83
See Hafner-Burton, supra note __, at 603.
84
See General Accounting Office, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Progress Made on Key Challenges
in First Year of Operations, GAO-05-625T, at 7 (2005). See also African Growth and Opportunity Act, 19
U.S.C. 3701-3747 (2000).
85
Cf. Albert H. Choi & Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 Law & Contemp. Prob.
33 (2007).

37

but necessary consequence, poor people in at least some states will have to suffer both
human rights abuse and a loss of foreign aid. For example, a sanctions regime imposed
on Iraq between the first and second Gulf Wars was designed to pressure Saddam
Hussein to step down or cooperate with other countries but mainly had the effect of
immiserating the Iraqi people.86 Even when foreign pressure works, people must suffer in
the short term so that improvements will occur in the long term.87
However, it may sometimes be unrealistic to expect that the threat to withhold aid
will cause a state to improve its compliance with human rights norms. The government
may be too weak or corrupt to change. In such cases, the decision to grant aid requires a
delicate tradeoff. On the one hand, aid will help alleviate the misery of the population. On
the other hand, it will likely increase the power of human-rights abusing government and
extend its hold on power.
At least in some cases, the tradeoff will favor foreign aid. Yet such an approach is
in tension with a human rights regime that makes no concessions to welfarist
considerations except in extreme cases. The result is that the human rights community
and the foreign aid community work at cross-purposes. One arm of a government scolds
a state for violating human rights law while another arm continues to dole out aid. One
NGO places the state on its list of human-rights violators, while another sets up clinics
and provides other benefits to the population that may reduce internal pressure on the
government to reform. This tension between the human rights and foreign aids regimes
threatens to derail progress toward the overlapping goal of both—to improve the wellbeing of people around the world.88
By contrast, a welfarist treaty would involve no such tension. The treaty could be
drafted to oblige developed states both to pressure states that fail to deliver adequate
welfare to their populations and to provide aid to states that show progress. When
86

Richard Garfield, Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 Through 1998: Assessing
the
Impact
of
the
Gulf
War
and
Economic
Sanctions
(1999),
available
at
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/garfield/dr-garfield.html; Mohamed M. Ali & Iqbal H. Shah, Sanctions and
Childhood Mortality in Iraq. , 9218 The Lancet 1851 (2000).
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Interestingly, the World Bank has been criticized for providing so much aid to middle-income countries.
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potential aid recipients have responsive governments, donor states should condition aid
on welfarist improvement, and should threaten sanctions or other penalties if welfare
does not improve, regardless of whether the government accepts aid. When potential aid
recipients do not have responsive governments (and are unlikely to obtain responsive
governments), then aid should be unconditional, as long as it reaches the intended
beneficiaries among the population of the recipient state. Sanctions would be avoided.
Currently, states have no legal obligations to provide aid to low-welfare states.
States nonetheless do provide such aid. Most wealthy states have foreign aid programs,
and although much aid, perhaps the majority of aid, is used to promote strategic interests,
at least some of it is used to help impoverished people in foreign countries, frequently the
victims of natural disasters or civil war.89 As noted above, the aid is not coordinated, and
for this reason it is probably not distributed optimally. Recognizing this problem, states
from time to time enter nonlegal agreements to coordinate the aid with a view of reaching
a particular goal.90
Under the current system, then, states have no obligation to give foreign aid
(though they do), while they do have an obligation to pressure states that violate human
rights. As I argued above, the aid regime and the human rights regime work at crosspurposes: much aid goes to human rights violators precisely because their populations are
so miserable. And states that feel diplomatic or public pressure to condemn the human
rights violations of strategic allies can, in effect, compensate the allies for the diplomatic
costs they incur by increasing foreign aid. In addition, some evidence suggests that aid
can weaken government institutions and even exacerbate civil war91—with predictably
unfortunate effects on human rights. A better system would coordinate aid and
pressure—the carrot and the stick.
Whether a welfare treaty that contained obligations to give aid is possible is not a
question I can answer here. Certainly, the obstacles would be significant; it may be
impossible to write a treaty that directed aid flows in a manner that all donor states found
acceptable. In addition, foreign aid has so far been largely unsuccessful for promoting
economic growth.92 It would be a mistake to freeze by treaty the amount or nature of
89
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foreign aid before academics understand how aid is optimally allocated (if at all). Still,
the literature does not show that foreign aid has no short-term, positive welfare effects.93
This means that minimal treaty provisions requiring high-welfare states to offer aid to
states that improve their welfare levels might be appropriate.
Conclusion
The inevitable objection to a welfarist treaty is that it would permit a state to
commit atrocities while claiming that overall welfare will increase because the public
benefits more than the victims lose—the kind of objection familiar from the endless
dispute between utilitarians and deontologists. One can just as well point out that human
rights treaties require governments to risk civil war rather than detain a potentially
dangerous person. Both types of approaches are vulnerable to the risk of a catastrophic
scenario. The superior value of the welfarist approach lies in its insistence that the
government would have to prove that its policies enhance public welfare.
Another objection is that arguments based on rights have stronger motivating
force than arguments based on well-being. It is easier for a person to complain that the
government has violated her right to a trial than to argue that by failing to grant her a
trial, the government failed to take seriously her well-being. However, the force of this
objection depends on rights actually either having intrinsic deontological value or
promoting well-being in a rule-utilitarian sense. Otherwise, rights-talk just plays off
misunderstandings. And it is not clear that the objection is correct on its own terms.94
People in the west spontaneously offer aid in response to natural disasters such as the
recent tsunami in South Asia; they seem less motivated by reports of ordinary human
rights violations such as the imprisonment of political dissenters than by reports of
famine, natural disaster, and civil war.
These objections aside, the welfarist treaty has two advantages over the human
rights treaties. It would advance an undeniable value—promoting the well-being of
people in poor countries—rather than a controversial and philosophically suspect
commitment to a bevy of rights. And it would use a common, simple, and transparent
metric for evaluating states, rather than a set of incommensurable and ambiguous
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standards. As a result, it would create a system of priorities and ease coordination among
states. Diplomatic pressure would be directed against low welfare states like Zimbabwe,
Sudan, and Chad, and not against high-welfare states, such as the United States and
China, which are in any event much more resistant to pressure. And foreign aid could be
better coordinated so as to help those who need it most.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
eric_posner@uclaw.uchicago.edu
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